Winning Delhi : The Vain Challenger! [Final Part]

[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 1 - The Narrative]
[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 2 - The Volunteer Force]
[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 3 - Channels and Methods]

Being a part of the whole comes with its own pitfalls. Weak parts of the strong whole tend to embrace complacency for confidence. This is probably what happened with BJP in Delhi. Delhi BJP does not have a reputation for being the most organized or coherent regional unit. Yet the way BJP was churning success after success, one hoped that the age of pathos in Delhi BJP would finally be done away with. This 'Hope', was the bastard of a thought trolling all BJPians on 10th Feb.

I was one to root vehemently for BJP & against AAP, with my liberal, progressive friends who make views out of "served news". I had to remove a boulder from my chest each time the phone rang that day, for it would invariably be from someone who'd be telling me what I already knew, "Kejriwal ne toh kamaal kar diya!" (Kejriwal has done amazingly well)

There are smart students who act so smart, they start looking stupid. They are so self-assured that they do not prepare the obvious questions before exams, hoping that (a) They won't be getting such obvious questions (b) By preparing for uncommon questions, they'll have something which others don't have (c) Nobody else would be preparing these questions. These are the guys who, when the results are out, claim, "I have no idea what went wrong. The examiner is a crook".

The obvious and most basic thing to do for BJP was to set-up, strengthen and effectively use its communication channels viz Mainstream Media (through spokespersons), Social Media and the foot-soldiers. None of these required any painstaking efforts from BJP. BJP was infact guilty of not doing more of the same.

Sprucing up Channels:

• For MSM, BJP has always boasted of some of the best debaters as their spokespersons. With a hostile media working against them, the likes of the feisty Meenakshi Lekhi and Smriti Irani were sorely missed. The new generation of BJP spokespersons, as opined by many BJP supporting observers, looked rather fatigued and defensive on TV debates. They could not counter such obvious lies as the 10 Lakh worth pin-striped suit or the manufactured rancor over Ms. Bedi's 'lying about towing the PM's car'.
• On Social Media, BJP's IT/Samvad Cells had successfully taken the good work done in Gujrat to people. This was when MSM was so uncharitable to BJP, that it would report none of Gujrat's achievements. IT/Samvad cells came up with achievement summaries, comparisons, charts, graphs, data, slides etc that highlighted the good work done in Gujrat. These helped ordinary BJP supporters in supporting BJP with more conviction and winning debates. Very little of this has continued since LS-2014. As of now, the only information circulated in support of BJP is that which the media reports in some obscure corner of their bulletins.
• LS-2014 had seen massive mobilization of foot-soldiers. Some very innovative and highly successful programs like "NaMo Chai Party" were organized nationwide. In the run up to Delhi elections, willing & eager volunteers were wondering when the party would summon them for campaign. By the time they were summoned, they barely had 15 days in hand while AAP had already campaigned for more than 3 months by then. Further, I can imagine no good reason why a successful program like NaMo Chai Party would not be replicated in states going for elections.

As we talk about BJP's communication channels, ominous news are afloat. The national cells dissolved by BJP way back in Nov 2014 have not been reconstituted yet. They include important communication bodies like the Samvad Cell. The grapevine says that dedicated volunteers, some of whom are pioneers of BJP's Social Media campaign, are being harassed and jackbooted by the Bihar BJP. You just cannot afford to alienate volunteers!

Identifying the right narrative:

Suggestion makers outside BJP have been critical of decision makers inside BJP over their campaign narrative, with many conflicting notions. Some see excessive Hindutva in BJP, some see a lack of it. Some were heard warning BJP against a negative campaign in future. Such dissonance in views only suggests that the BJP did not have any identifiable narrative for the Delhi elections. In my opinion, these suggestions by themselves are mono-causal, reductionist, arguably agenda-driven, simplistic and only partially helpful if at all.

Delhi was won over by a party which owes its existence to negative campaigns. Those suggesting BJP against negative campaigns probably want to shield their favorites from being critiqued while they keep pounding on BJP. That said, campaigns, whether negative or positive, have to be timed well. One should learn the art from evangelists and communists. They attack, criticize and try to debunk the standing beliefs and create affective vacuum in their target audience.. Then they fill it with their own world view. 15 days of haphazard campaigning was just not enough for BJP to achieve this. The best they could do in 15 days were negative campaigns and hope Modi's image gave the positive push. It didn't work.

As for Hindutva, anyone who suggests BJP against it, does not want BJP to win. With not more than 20% students going for Higher education in India (GER as of 2013-14), the prospect of attracting people with Right Wing macroeconomic principles is limited. On the other hand, Indians do not need to be taught to understand Socialist economics. It's simple - "You need freebies, freebies are your right, WE will get you freebies, vote for us". But then, people, more-so the simpletons, relate with the pride of being Hindu. Hindutva, is the answer to socialist propaganda even as people take their time to come to terms with macroeconomic considerations.

During the campaign, I talked to auto-walas, rickshaw-walas, wage labourers etc, other than house-owning middle classes. Freebies made sense to all. I would frequently come off as insensitive to poor while pushing hard to explain why freebies are bad, but they all related with the Hindu pride. They all accepted that AAP was trying hard to appease minorities. It struck a chord.

It is also noteworthy that a resurgent India needs not just change, but also progress and not just progress but also pride. The strains of Hindu revival as evident on SM, are spearheaded by the upsurging, aspirational, young enthusiastic middle-class men and women. Cultural nationalism appeals to all those who seek pride in their being. That said, the dominant messengers of the day are still left leaning. Subtlety in passing the message and avoiding unnecessary acrimony and bad press should be the key. Minorites must be assured that Hindutva is not directed against them. Hindutva is inclusive of them and is rather happy to have them share its legacy. In the age of accountability, people need messages sent out by more than mere posturing. The ground volunteers and not attention-grabbing, chest-thumping self-proclaimed mascots, better be interpreting, explaining and disseminating this message.

Development was the key to winning LS-2014 and development agenda should be the most prominent message sent across all communication channels. It appeals to all classes, sections, regions and cultures that make India. Development alone, and not appeasement or apology as practiced by the self-certified secular parties, will help win over whatever minority support the BJP might get. Delhi BJP bungled by having a high-level vision document rather than a well-researched manifesto, that too at the eleventh hour. The electorate might not read the manifesto, but an absence of one does tell people that enough thought has not been put in. It gives the contenders opportunities to portray BJP as presumptuous, over-confident and taking people for granted.

Looking back, learning forth:

The design of the political chessboard is changing. Old moves will not work with the new design. And frankly, old moves did not work on the old board either. Delhi election was managed by BJP the way elections were managed by them before 2014. The results were little different, only worse.

Actually speaking, in the Indian political space as of now, there is BJP and then there is every other party. Theoretically, with Delhi the anti-BJP political class have found a way of holding up BJP. For BJP and its supporters, elections are battles for hope and glory. For the anti-BJP, these are battles for their own survival. They are likely to make bigger compromises and they are making such compromises.

Indians are still not averse to socialist economics, they are only averse to the old proponents of Socialism. Change the faces and socialism starts afresh. The anti-BJP political class might well find their mascot in Mr. Kejriwal with his carefully cultivated 'honest' and 'aam admi' image.

Mr. Kejriwal, the technical man, if empowered, will evidently focus exclusively on technical aspects like messaging, rather than on value aspects or actual governance. The BJP can ignore him only at its own peril. BJP will have to put its house in order and get the basics of public communication right.

I believe, any message can be registered with people provided the communication channels are operationalized and strengthened. Difficult-to-set narratives only take more persistence. AAP surged ahead from the dump truck of obsolescence to win Delhi with their persistence. However, BJP had communicated better than all others put together, during LS-2014, they can do so again. With a national presence, ever increasing membership, good governance track records, the financial and technical wherewithal and inspirational leadership, BJP is better disposed to dominate Indian political discourse.

BJP was vain as the fight for Delhi set in. It was reduced to a mere challenger, not even a credible opposition after the elections. But the debacle of vanity can give way to grace. The strengths of BJP are its internal democracy and greater responsiveness vis-a-vis other parties. It is riding on hopes and has shown promise thus far. I'm hopeful that the BJP will learn from Delhi. I'm hopeful they'll show grace. And I'm hopeful they'll win big again.

The End

(Declaration: The author is a BJP supporter, member and volunteer. The views in this article are based on news reports and on-ground experiences while campaigning during Delhi elections)

Winning Delhi: Part 3 - Channels and Methods

[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 1 - The Narrative]
[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 2 - The Volunteer Force]

Doston... Media bik chuki hai

 (Friends... the media is sold out)

Said Mr. Kejriwal, not once, not twice but on every nearly opportunity he got to talk about the media. He wanted to imprison media persons (youtube video) and most recently, he made it clear that if not for his own promotion or attacking his opponents, Media is a pariah (link)! And yet we all know his is a party without a precedent, created and nurtured by the media, it managed to form a govt in Delhi not once but twice in a space of one year. We wonder why, and more importantly how he manages to find favors with the media, why does media publicity help him more than others and why is AAP relatively less affected than others by media criticism, at least as far as Delhi is concerned?

Mass-Media is just one element in the scheme of messaging for mass outreach and we shall explore its role and standing in the larger context.

The Channels:

In electoral campaigning, Media (print and Television) has always been of importance. It's potential has been widely acknowledged by all parties so much so that they resorted to paying for favorable news. Social Media, though with a reach much less than convention print and TV, is emerging as potent means of opinion formation and is growing very fast. The mainstay of AAP campaign in Delhi this time around has been its Foot Soldiers (recruitment discussed in Winning Delhi: Part 2) who worked tirelessly for over 3-4 months, wearing the AAP campaign on their heads.

Print and TV media:

Mass media has always been potent in setting the course of street-corner discussions and general public opinion. Media has the ability to influence opinions of even those who do not subscribe to newspapers or watch news on TV, specially in Urban centers. The emergence of Social Media has challenged mass media to some extent but MSM's (mainstream media) influence has not been decisively undermined yet.

The entrenched Indian media is predominantly left oriented for reasons which warrant independent analysis. It does not take much to notice that BJP, being the strongest party with Right Wing traits in India, is anathema to most of MSM. Most media commentators also seem to have personal revulsion for anything that looks saffron, sounds Hindu and feels indigenous. With the citadels of the grand old dynastic socialist party desecrated by the BJP over and over, they went all out to back the only potential challenger to BJP in Delhi, AAP.

AAP also managed to include in its coterie media celebs. Some like Ashutosh and Ashish Khetan joined their ranks, others continue to help them overtly. SM exposes biases of these media celebs almost on a daily basis. Breakaway AAPians also testify to these media biggies being in cahoots with Mr. Kejriwal.

The resultant of these factors was that the media went out and out to give a piggyback ride to AAP during Delhi elections. AAP's stunts were glorified, their fallacies kid-gloved, their opponents choke-slammed. Media turned Mr Kejriwal into everything desirable, from a crusader for honesty to a yoga model. Hell, they even gave his humble barber a prime time show!

Social Media:

AAP has always focused on media and messaging and Social Media has been an integral part of their campaign from the IAC days. They have a dedicated team including everything from social media analysts, observers, photoshoppers and trolls to bots. Social Media is effective in challenging and running counter narratives to the main-stream media if need be.

I had observed in an earlier post how they are attempting to coordinate the Social Media behavior and narrative of their supporters (link). Some AAP insiders on SM like the handle @AAPleaks on twitter also testify to AAP's attempts of organizing and regulating Social Media conduct of AAP leaning handles. These attempts include monitoring and troll attacks on prominent pro-BJP handles.

Foot Soldiers:

Arguably the most effective medium of communication as far as the Delhi elections were concerned. We had seen in the previous write-up how AAP raised an army of numerous dedicated volunteers for Delhi. Many of these volunteers worked full-time, reaching out to everyone from slums-dwellers, students to households. They were well coordinated and carried to the electorate, the AAP narrative. They proved to be effective bulwarks against any criticism of AAP in MSM or on Social Media and reached out where the media didn't. Over a period of 3-4 months through effective Geobbelessian propaganda, they managed to sell to the electorate the baked truths and colored perceptions that were part of the AAP narrative (described in Part 1).

Methods:

As narrated earlier, AAP started well in time with their foot-soldiers and SM enthusiasts swinging into action. As early as Jan 2014 AAP had managed to establish an organization in Delhi with high granularity. Responsibilities were allocated up to the booth level.

From my contacts among AAP volunteers, I know that they had fairly regular meetings with lot of downward communication, sloganeering, "Sab mile hue hain" (they are all are in cahoots), "Sab bike hue hain" (they're all sold out) etc. What these meetings achieved were solidarity among volunteers, connect between leaders and volunteers, effective allocation of responsibilities and dissemination of desired narrative. Anyone who's known to have used their brains beyond the AAP narrative is also known to have left AAP. My own experience narrated here.

The enthusiastic students volunteers, many from well-off families and reputed universities in Delhi, absorbed by the romanticism of revolutionary changes, proved to be wonderful brand ambassadors for AAP. They were ready to be innovative, to chase dreams, to rally hard. They organized street plays, flash-mobs, campaigned with their guitars and drums in slums, held "swachhta abhiyaans" (cleanliness drives) in slums and colonies alike and created a perception that "AAP is doing something". Their approach to campaign would resemble scenes picked straight out of revolution-romanticizing  Bollywood movies like "Yuva", "Main Azad hu" etc and had a high visual appeal. Young boys and girls from well-off families cleaning slum streets would foster the notion that boundaries between rich and poor are finally shattering and that AAP is the one to do it.

These presentable youngsters trained through meetings, email updates, newsletters would also go door-to-door, ready with their planned and targeted narrative, connect with the middle-class and try to convince them. It is generally held that most households were approached more than once in the 3-4 months, apart from the sabhas, nataks and rallies.

It is my observation, and it might well be correct, that the SM attitude of the AAP supporters was coherent. I had very few AAPians trolling me over their criticism as compared to their obscene virulence before the LS-2014 elections. SM users would also agree that AAPians were more successful at making regular trends on twitter in the run-up to Delhi elections. Though speculative, it would be reasonable to assume that AAP is attempting organization and coherence in the virtual space as well. Contrast this with the BJP supporters ranging from exclusively economic right wingers to hard-core Hindutva enthusiasts locking horns every now and then.

The mass media has always been publicly held as conspiratorial by AAP, even as they made strong personal and ideological connections with the same media, behind the scenes. It arguably worked to the advantage of AAP for a considerable segment of the electorate. I believe that is how they intended for it to work. For any criticism the foot-soldiers and SM volunteers would propel the notion, "Did we not tell you that the media is sold out?". For accolades coming their way, it would be, "Even the sold out media cannot hide this goodness of AAP". It must be noted that even as the Media played up AAP, through alternate channels and planned narrative, AAP was prepared to counter and bypass mass media.

All this presents a formidable picture of AAP's preparation for Delhi elections, and results would suggest that the preparation was indeed formidable. But I wish to clarify here that the picture brought out is idealized in favor of AAP. Not everywhere did the campaign manage to work like a well-oiled machine. My attempt has been to bring out the strengths of AAP's campaign. For if a counter has to be prepared, it must be against the strongest possible and most fortuitous elements of their campaign.

Having nearly circumscribed AAP's campaign, it would be useful to identify how BJP managed to ensure its rout. Also, what it could have possibly done to win the day and what it might consider doing in future. I will be taking it up in the fourth and last part of this series.

Continued by [Winning Delhi: The Vain Challlenger [Final Part]]

(Declaration: The author is a BJP supporter, member and volunteer. The views in this article are based on news reports and on-ground experiences while campaigning during Delhi elections)

Winning Delhi: Part 2 - The Volunteer force

[Link to Winning Delhi: Part 1 - The Narrative]

BJP's victory was wildly celebrated  and their tenure began with lots of hopes. It wasn't long before the first challenge showed up. In July-August of 2014, the streets of Mukherjee Nagar in Delhi were thronged with students from the Hindi belt, demanding postponement of the UPSC Civil Services prelims exams and a change (as allegedly promised) in the prelims pattern. There were demonstrations, sit-ins, roads were blocked by agitating students and then lathi-charge was ordered!

Many of these students from UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, Haryana had held the saffron flag high and campaigned for BJP earlier. They were proud that the new government owes its majority to the whitewash in their respective states. The 'Cultural Nationalist' government, it was hoped would be sympathetic to the cause of Hindi medium students (to which I was sympathetic to an extent). The new government however did not relent and their handling of the issue was botched up in many ways. Speculations of Arun Jaitley opposing any recourse and Rajnath Singh ordering the lathi-charge after promising positive action during election campaigns in UP, did not help the BJP's image. The lathi-charges hurt more than just their bodies.

Of all parties perceptibly insinuating and fueling the agitation, AAP was the most effective in capitalizing on them. AAP articulated the problem sympathetically where they could, including their official website (link here). This agitation gave AAP 5000-7000 volunteers (based on on-ground estimates) of their total volunteer force of around 40,000 (reported here) used for the Delhi campaign. Many of these neo-volunteers will likely carry the AAP flag in UP and Bihar also and it shall be claimed that the Modi government is hypocritical about Cultural Nationalism & its commitment to development of UP and Bihar.

The Volunteer force:

The above case is one instance of AAP identifying and making good the opportunity at hand. This was one rich harvest of volunteers. Other than this one instance AAP has grabbed every opportunity to intervene in community issues, if not by doing something real, then by making noisy, noticeable protests. They've protested against police (their favorite), Jal Board, MCD and any other organ of the state possible. These protests, though widely ridiculed and effectively useless, actually made many people believe that "at least they are doing something" and each protest helped them harvest new volunteers even as some disillusioned ones left.

Another factor in AAP's favor is the choice of their ideology. Edmund Burke had keenly observed:

He who is not a republican at twenty compels one to doubt the generosity of his heart; but he who, after thirty, persists, compels one to doubt the soundness of his mind

The leftist locus of the AAP, very naturally finds resonance with youngsters. An estimated 3.6 lakh new voters got the franchise since April 2014. Many of these contributed as volunteers and evidently most voted for AAP. The young volunteers, mostly students from well-off families would be the most effective campaigners, as we shall see in the next part.

Another effective trick employed by AAP was to approach voters in blocks, religious, social and professional. AAP's closeness with Muslim clerics and community leaders is no secret. Some meetings happened with common knowledge, others (rumored) behind closed doors. The election results somewhat verify these claims. Approximately 78% of muslims voted for AAP. Muslims evidently have strong community preferences in politics in India. Community leaders thus, are potent opinion makers. It was a smart move that ensured both reach and penetration for AAP in the community.

Similarly, AAP approached and ensured support of autorickshaw unions who campaigned for them with AAP posters and flags on their autos, even while they were at work. Other than the speeches, campaigns, spreading paranoia and making promises, AAP's general approach was to reach out to organized social, religious and professional groups rather than looking at voters as amorphous or loosely-bound entities. It helped that they were supported by the Communist groups, who had the pretext of 'keeping communal forces at bay'. With them, they brought any and all of the trade unions, workers' unions and student unions over which they exercised influence.

Two things that AAP worked well, were understanding the demographics of Delhi and choosing the ideology. It must be noted that unions or social-communal blocks are formed of and driven by insecurities. For Muslims and Christians it could be insecurity due to possibility of majority domination, for trade unions, it is due to possibility of capitalist and state oppression. The leftist ideology, is a defining characteristic of the AAP although they deny being bound by ideologies. This ideology feeds and plays up insecurities. The skill employed by AAP was in identifying blocks and engineering the perfect combination between the target block and an appropriate narrative. They worked at it for months and their efforts gave them rich sets of volunteers with diverse affiliations. These would prove very useful in nurturing the perception of "everybody wants Kejriwal" for the impressionable middle class and young voters, when the heat of campaigning would mount.

As a subtext I would like to try and identify the nature of the beast that Mr Kejriwal's mind is. He is not so much an ideological person as he is technical. His choice of ideology in fact, is suited to the ends he desires. His famed "U-turns" are not exceptions to rule but the very nature of his politics. He is ruthlessly directional once he has identified his target. Considerations of honesty, loyalty or consistency would not rein him in. His technical brilliance is in that he gives communication topmost priority. He designs and redesigns his communication strategy. He voraciously assesses public perception and works out appropriate narratives even if it means sacrificing consistency.  I believe there will be more U-turns and they'll keep coming. Most importantly for now, he focuses on the lowest rungs of his volunteer-base, the foot-soldiers, Social Media warriors and on skilling, organizing, reaching out and motivating them for the job.

It is for these reasons that his party gave a better performance despite many of his notable colleagues defecting and working against him. In fact their ouster served him well by strengthening his position within the party where (rhetoric apart) everyone else is a relative minnow now. Mr. Kejriwal's hold on his party is unchallenged and absolute, specially after the Delhi victory. In real terms, his stature in AAP is no different from Gandhis' in Congress, Ms. Mayawati's in BSP or Ms. Jayalalitha's in AIADMK. He commands a cult following with the volunteers as much as any of these do.

In the next part I will be exploring the use of communication channels by AAP. I will later attempt to identify what BJP could have done and can do in future to neutralize this emerging challenge.

Continued by  [Winning Delhi: Part 3 - Channels and Methods] and [Winning Delhi : The Vain Challenger! [Final Part]]

(Declaration: The author is a BJP supporter, member and volunteer. The views in this article are based on news reports and on-ground experiences while campaigning during Delhi elections)

Winning Delhi: Part 1 - The Narrative

By 2:00 pm on the 10th of Feb, it was all but official that AAP had Delhi with the mother of all landslide electoral victories. The mighty BJP, on a victory ride since May 2014 was not just halted, its chariot was overturned in Delhi. The ignominy amplified by gloating news anchors who heaved a sigh of relief announcing what they always wanted to, "The Modi wave is finally over"! Not long after, theories were afloat on why BJP lost.

Theories attributed the loss (since Delhi results was all about BJP's loss) to myriad reasons ranging from unbridled Hindutva to a lack thereof. Some challenged the choice of Kiran Bedi as CM candidate, some blamed it on a negative campaign and one article blamed it on discipline hating Baniyas and lazy babus and then there was the favorite, "This is an indictment of Modi govt for its failure". 

It is my intention to dispel some of these theories while focusing on the communication strategy and narrative used by AAP vis-a-vis the BJP. The complete analysis will be in parts touching on the various aspects of the campaign.

Election campaigning is the art of communication. The objective of a good campaign is to establish an emotional connect with the voters, so much so, that they need no further reason to vote in favor of a party. When a party's narrative registers with people, they vote in its favor. The communication strategy is all about identifying the narrative that registers well, the channels of communication to be used and the message itself. These ingredients converge through effective methods of dissemination of the message, set to the narrative, using available channels.

Exploring AAP's communication strategy:

The Narrative:

After the results a number of articles appeared on how IIT-B students helped conduct a sentiment analysis based on inputs from Social Media. Such softwares are not unknown to the BJP IT cell, though I cannot confirm if they were used for the Delhi election.

This analysis helped AAP form their narrative during campaign. What comes out of an on the ground study of voter perception is that AAP managed to register the following with voters:

• Modi is good for a central role, Delhi needs someone who understands their local problems.
• People have seen both the BJP and Congress and there is little difference between the two. Let us give the new guy a chance. [Incidentally the last time BJP was in power in Delhi was in 1998, yet voters were convinced they'd seen enough.]
• Modi ji is good but a strong opposition is important for keeping check on him anyway. AAP, as an anti-corruption crusader is apt and should be empowered for the job.
• Modi ji is for the rich, AAP is for the poor.

The use of this narrative can be substantiated by the news of AAP using Modi's picture on its website way back in Nov 2014. This is also a pointer to the fact that AAP had already begun on structuring its narrative as early as Nov. Here's a screenshot of what AAP had put on its official page.

Among others, this narrative isolated Modi from BJP. With this smart move, AAP managed to avoid challenging people's endearment of Modi while still continuing to attack the BJP. Effectively, anything that the BJP govt at the center did or might do, which created a positive sentiment among people, could be attributed only to Modi keeping BJP aside. The theory of "Delhi votes against Modi... Modi wave is over" does not hold water. The results suggest that apart from a minor 0.9% fall BJP has retained its vote share and the votes that Modi got for BJP, riding his wave, are still with BJP. There's no love lost for Modi. BJP Delhi lost because it did not build up on what the Modi wave did for them and allowed AAP to pull all anti-BJP votes, swing votes, communal voting blocks and first time voters in its favor.

This Modi-BJP distinction opened up the BJP for AAP's attacks with the usual "Saare bhrasht hain... Sab mile hue hain ji... Cong-BJP sab ek hi hain... etc" (They're all corrupt... They are all in cahoots... Congress & BJP are one and the same.. etc). The thing about reason is that it is not absolute, there's my reason and there's yours. While this narrative might not impress incorrigible BJP supporters on SM, it did appeal to the average Delhiites' reason. 

This narrative also allowed AAP to remain consistent with its attack on everything under the sky, not wearing the AAP-topi. The BJP, RSS, Congress, media, business houses, bureaucrats, police etc were all attacked preemptively and consistently, as is typical of the AAP. AAP's perennial victim status was reinforced. The hopes tied to "Ache din" were made specific to Delhi and neutralized. As in Marxist literature, people were imparted "the subjective realization of objective truth". The objective truth being AAP's standard leftist narrative, where people are victims. The victim electorate would readily identify with the victim party.

India does not need to be trained for Socialist expectations. In the 67 years since independence, we've had successive governments contesting elections on socialist promises and running socialist-style economies. Even the ABV led government dwindled between left and right to satisfy all stakeholders. 

That said, freebies never ceased to be attractive to a large section of Indians. Reforms towards a free market economy are still unattractive and short sight is still the normal range of sight for a large section. Revolutionary change and magical solutions to all real-life problems are still romantic to most of us. AAP, like all other parties realizes this, but unlike the rest exploited it in their manifesto and created a picture of the promised land.

The strength of AAP's narrative was also that it was carefully targeted. The 70 promises made in their manifesto attempted to cover every possible social/economic/cultural section of Delhi. While free WiFi appealed to youngsters and most of the first time voters, free electricity and water appealed to the households. The stylishly intellectual middle class was impressed by the responsibility of giving India a strong opposition, thrust on them. Weaker sections believed in "Modi-for-rich AAP-for-poor".

However merely having an effective narrative is not enough. It needs to be taken to people and imprinted on their conscience. In later parts I shall be discussing the communication channels, volunteer pooling and the campaign method combining all the ingredients. Not much can be said about BJP's campaign except that they did not do most of what AAP did, yet BJP's efforts will be evaluated in contrast.

Continued with: [Winning Delhi: Part 2 - The Volunteer force] ; [Winning Delhi: Part 3 - Channels and Methods] and [Winning Delhi : The Vain Challenger! [Final Part]]

(Declaration: The author is a BJP supporter, member and volunteer. The views in this article are based on news reports and on-ground experiences while campaigning during Delhi elections)